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ARTICLES
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY
AND THE BUSINESS BENEFIT:
THE NEED FOR CLARITY

"'MYSTERY' was made possible by a grant from Mobil
Corporation."'

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, Mobil's contributions to charitable causes reached
almost $10 million.= Even more generous, Exxon gave over $2.5
million to public television, $19 million to colleges and universities, and $3.2 million to the arts, museums and historical associations, as well as millions to other donee^.^ All told, Exxon
gave more than $39.8 million4 and with IBM, Atlantic Richfield
and similar companies chipping in, charitable causes received
nearly $4.5 billion from U.S. corporations.While not insignifi* Assistant Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova University; B.S.
Towson State College; J.D. Georgetown University. The author wishes to express special
thanks to William Ruggiero for his assistance in the production of this article.
1. Transcript of underwriting acknowledgement for "MYSTERY," a television series featured on public television.
2. MOBILFOUNDATION,
INC.,1987 STATEMENT
OF CONTRIBUTIONS
24 (1988) [hereinafter "MOBILSTATEMENT"].
3. E x x o ~CORPORATION.
DIMENSIONS
1987. A REPORTON EXXON'S1987 CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
AND THE EXXON
EDUCATION
FOUNDATION
REPORT3 (1988)
[hereinafter " E x x o ~REPORT"].
4. Id. a t 2.
5. AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION
OF FUND-RAISING
COUNSEL
TRUSTFOR PHILANTHROPY
GIVING USA, THE ANNUAL
REPORTON PHILANTHROPY
FOR THE YEAR1987. Total charitable
contributions from all sources for 1987 was $93.68 billion. Id. Of the $76.8 billion given
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cant, this sum represented less than five percent of all charitable
giving for that year, as individuals accounted for $76.8 b i l l i ~ n . ~
What is the motivation for such philanthropy? Admittedly,
many individuals and businesses give simply to realize the tax
benefits.' Even without the tax deduction, many individuals who
give would find it hard to refuse the Girl Scouts or the church
offering plate. Moral sentiments are decisive. But, beyond tax
incentives, why do these non-human entities - business corporations - give to charity and how can 'such philanthropy be reconciled with the most basic aspect of a business corporation, i.e.,
the object of making money for its investors?
It is supposed that corporations give to charitable causes
out of self-interest - indeed, it is argued that this is all that the
law permitse - as a measured business response to political
. ~ can corporations give out of
pressures and public h o ~ t i l i t y But
altruism - simply on the basis that giving is the social responsibility of all citizens, including corporate citizens? Case law and
some commentary appear to answer no. Nevertheless, the actual
giving practices of corporations seem .difficult to explain
otherwise.
In early corporate history, it was of great importance to examine the motivation for expenditures. The common law was
most exacting in its scrutiny of the exercise of corporate powers
and generally prohibited activities by corporations not directly
related to the corporate business.'O The relationship between
charitable contributions and the achievement of business re.turns, initially, eluded the courts and scholars. Any expenditure
of corporate assets on causes which appeared altruistic in nature
to charity by individuals, more than half, $43.6 billion, went to religious organizations.
Id. at 9.
6. Id.
7. Under the Internal Revenue Code, individual taxpayers can reduce taxable income by amounts contributed t o charity up t o fifty percent o f adjusted gross income
(with certain other limitations). Corporate taxpayers can take a deduction for charitable
contributions of up t o ten percent o f taxable income. I.R.C. 9 170(b)(2)(1990).
8. See Prunty, Love And The Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REV. 467, 475-76
(1960);see also Garrett, Corporate Donations, 22 Bus.LAW.297 (1967).
9. Manne, The Limits And Rationale Of Corporate A1trusim:'An Individualistic
Model, 59 VA.L. REV. 708 (1973);see also Note, Corporate Altruism: A Rational Approach, 59 GEO.L.J. 117 (1970).
10. Id.
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was condemned as ultra vires or beyond the corporation's legitimate powers." However, changes in prevailing industrial conditions brought along changes in business methods. At the turn of
the century, some courts grew receptive to the notion that a donation to an otherwise charitable cause might yield economic
benefits to the corporation.la In one of the early cases recognizing this theory, Steinway v. Steinway & Sons,lS the court
explained:
It is a question, therefore, in each case of the logical relation,of the act to the corporation purpose
expressed in the charter. If that act is one which
is lawful in itself and not otherwise prohibited, is
done for the purpose of serving corporate ends
and is reasonably tributary to the promotion of
those ends, in a substantial and not in a remote
and fanciful sense, it may fairly be considered
within charter powers. The field of corporate action in respect to the exercise of incidental powers
is thus, I think, an expanding one. As industrial
conditions change, business methods must change
with them, and acts become permissible which at
an earlier period would not have been considered
to be within corporate power."
In light of current interpretations of a corporation's power
to give to charity and the enactment of statutes in virtually
every state and the District of Columbia expressly empowering
corporations to make charitable contributions,16 it is still fair to
ask to what extent the law limits the power of corporate managers or whether charitable giving is a matter of business judgment, a prerogative of the corporation's board of directors.
Many charitable gifts, such as contributions t o inner city programs to aid the homeless or contributions to humanistic studies
a t liberal arts colleges, are open to attack as merely altruistic id
their aim. Despite the appearance of altruism though, can it be
11. Community Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Fields, 128 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir.
1942).
12. For example, establishment of a hospital for employees of the corporation might
generate greater productivity from a healthy and contented workforce.
13. 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
14. Id. at 47, 40 N.Y.S. at 720. See also text accompanying notes 38-69, infra.
L. R. 117, 136 n.
15. See Note, Corporate Altruism: A Rational Approach, 59 GEO.
113 (1970).

Heinonline - - 20 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 241 1990

242 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:239

proven that corporate managers are not in reality chilled by the
necessity to demonstrate some discernable return to the
corporation?
Recently, the American Law Institute ("ALI"), as part of its
Corporate Governance Project,l6 proposed a rule to define the
limits of a business corporation's power to make charitable contributions. Proposed Section 2.01, The Objective and Conduct of
the Business Corporation, would provide:
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view
to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain, except that, whether or not corporate profit
and shareholder gain are thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business

(c) may devote a reasonable am'ount of resources
to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and
philanthropic purposes."
As with the other areas addressed in the Corporate Governance Project, the ALI perceived a need to restate or clarify often
conflicting or illogical legal principles in light of historical and
judicial developments. There is a need for such a restatement on
the power of a business corporation to make charitable
contributions.
This need for clarity or harmony is the subje,ct of this essay.
Part I1 summarizes a philosophical debate between two scholars
on the mission of the corporation. Part I11 briefly traces the historical development of the relevant principles and Part IV ex16. The mission of the Corporate Governance Project is contained within the subtitle of the work, that is, to provide "Analysis and Recommendations" on corporate practice. The drafters explain that all statements concerned with law should be regarded as
recommendations of the Institute, with the context and the explanations in the comment
making clear how far a recommendation is believed to be consistent with prevailing law
and how far legal change is contemplated and if the latter, whether by decision or by
legislation. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations vii-ix
(Am. Law Inst. Tent. Draft No. 2 1984).
17. Id. at 25.
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amines the actual philanthropic practices of several large publicly held corporations. Finally, Part V considers the continuing
significance of the common law rule in light of these practices
and urges support for the ALI proposal.

11. CHARITY AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION THE DEBATE
Whether or not corporate managers may direct corporate
profits away from shareholders to public charities raises at once
the issue of the role of the corporation and its managers in society. In the early 1930's, two leading corporate law scholars,
Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, debated the question.18 In
Berle's view:
All powers granted to a corporation or to the
management of a corporation, or to any group
within the corporation, whether derived from
statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at
all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of
all the shareholders as their interest appears.lB

.

Thus, according to Berle, corporate managers were "trustees"
for the benefit of the shareholders and their sole responsibility
was to the shareholders, and not to society generally.a0 Berle's
thesis was far from idle theory, as significant developments in
the law of corporations were then unfolding. Most importantly,
the enactment of liberal corporate statutes which multiplied the
powers of corporate managers and the growth in size of corporations meant that, increasingly, shareholders relinquished control
over the use of their property to corporate manager^.^' Few
doubted the need to establish controls which would more effectively prevent corporate managers from diverting corporate profits from stockholders into their own pockets.aa
In 1932, Dodd responded to Berle. While he agreed with the
18. For a critical analysis of the debate, see Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on
the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM.
L. REV.1458 (1964).
19. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV.L. REV.1049, 1056-59
(1931).
& MEANS,
THEMODERN
CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE
20. Id. at 1073-74; see also BERLE
(1932).
PROPERTY
21. BERLE& M ~ A Nsupra
S
note 15, at 4-5.
22. BERLE& MEANS
supra note 16, at 247-49.
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need to protect shareholders from self-seeking managers, he did
not agree that adoption of hard rules limiting permissible objects of the business corporations was the answer.as Rather,
Dodd noted a growing feeling that business had responsibilities
to the community, and that corporate managers who control
business should voluntarily, without legal compulsion, perform
in such a way as to fulfill those resp~nsibilities.~'
He stated:
The view that those who manage our business
corporations should concern themselves with the
interests of employees, consumers, and the general public, as well as of the stockholders, is thus
advanced today by persons whose position in the
business world is such as to give them great power
of influencing both business opinion and public
opinion generally.a6

In fact, Professor Dodd points out:
[Tlhere are indications that even today corporation managers not infrequently use corporate
funds in ways which suggest a social responsibility rather than an exclusively profit-making viewpoint. Take, for example, the matter of gifts by
business corporations to local charities . . . The
view that directors may within limits properly use
corporate funds to support charities which are important to the welfare of the community in which
the corporation does business probably comes
much nearer to representing the attitude of public opinion and the present corporate practice
than does the traditional language of courts and

Many corporations, in the absence of explicit statutory authority and in spite of the traditional language of the courts, regularly made contributions to charitable causes. Twenty years
later, following the enactment of statutory provisions authoriz23. Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV.1145,
1147-48(1932).
24. Id. at 1153-54.
25. Id. at 1156.
26. Id. at 1159.
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ing corporations to make charitable contributions and significant
court decisions on the issue, Berle concluded that "[tlhe argument has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in
favor of Professor Dodd's contention."''
111. TO GIVE OR NOT TO GIVE? - THE ANSWER AT
COMMON LAW
The traditional language of the courts on the mission of the
business corporation was that this entity existed for the benefit
of its shareholder^.^^ Under this conception, charity had no place
~ ~ the law did not always
within the. business c o r p o r a t i ~ n .But
take so narrow a view of the corporation's powers. On the contrary, at its genesis, the corporation promised service to society.
By the eighteenth century, it was accepted doctrine that the
right to conduct business in the corporate form was a matter of
According to Hurst, the reasons for this polroyal prerogati~e.~~
icy had more to do with politics than economics.
The impelling objective was to help focus and secure political power at the head of the state. Values of governmental or business efficiency might
move the grantees of charters. But through the
early seventeenth century these were not the
prime concerns of the Crown, which took the lead
in asserting the national government's exclusive
creative authority. . . .81

Thus, it suited the crown to issue charters to companies
which promised public economic benefits. In fact, from the six27. BERLE,T H E ~ O T H CENTURYCAPITALIST
REVOLUTION
169 (1954). Other scholars,
however, have not conceded t o Dodd's theory, as the list of commentary on the social
responsibility of corporations is legion. See e.g., Sommer, The Struggle for Corporate
Responsibility, 8 CARDOZO
L. REV.795 (1987); Murphy, Ethical Concerns Among Corporate Executives, 21 VAL.U.L. REV. 631 (1987); Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility:
What it Might Mean, If It Were Really T o Matter, 71 IOWA L. REV.557 (1986); Engel,
An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN.L. REV. 1 (1979); Epstein,
Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS
L. J. 1287 (1979).
28. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W.668 (1919).
29. Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co., 23 Del. Ch. 654 (1883).
OF T H E BUSINESS
CORPORATION
I N T H E LAW OF T H E
30. HURST,THELEGITIMACY
UNITED
STATES1780-1970 3 (1970).
31. Id. at 3.
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teenth century, royal chartering of companies to develop foreign
trade and colonies was a prominent feature of national policy.8a
The dual object of the business corporation continued in the
united States. The earliest business corporations established at
the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
centuries were founded for public. service objectives such as
building turnpikes and canals, supplying water, fire fighting and
providing insurance.88 However, out of fear of great .aggregations
of wealth and manpower, the corporate privilege was granted
sparingly and strict limits were placed on size, scope of activity,
and amount of real property that could be heldaS4
It was not until the end of the nineteenth century, under
the momentum of the industrial revolution, that states enacted
general corporation codes under which entrepreneurs could organize themselves for most business purposes, without the old
limitations on size and ownership of property.86Eventually, with
the proliferation of corporations in all nature of business activity
and the liberalization of corporation codes, private profit became
generally accepted as the controlling objective in all businesses
other than those classed broadly as public u t i l i t i e ~ . ~ ~
Perhaps the most celebrated case to articulate this view is
~ ~ 1919, the Ford Motor
Dodge v. Ford Motor C o r n p ~ n y .By
32. Id. According to Hurst, the' royal charters legitimized the public functions performed by these trading companies in organizing terms of trade, setting up local governments, controlling customs, and in effect, making foreign policy in their areas of operation. Id. at 41 see generally Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American
Business Corporation, 52 Bus. HIST.REV.30, 45-47(1978)and Williston, History of the
Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV.L.REV.105, 109-110(1888).According to Williston, among the more successful trading companies were the East India Company, the Royal African Company, and the Hudson's Bay Company. Id.
33. CHAYES,
INTRODUCTION
TO DAVIS,CORPORATIONS
(paper ed. 1961); DAVIS,ESSAYS
IN THE EARLIER
HISTORY
OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS
7 (1917).
34. Seavoy, supra note 27, at 49;see also CARY& EISENBERC,
CASESAND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS
38 (5th ed. 1980).
35. CONARD,
CORPORATIONS
IN PERSPECTIVE
13 (1970).In the late eighteenth century,
a number of states began following the practice in England and enacted legislation providing for self-incorporation, thereby avoiding the need for a special legislative act for a
corporate charter, although the early statutes limited their application to religious, charisupra note 33, at 2; DAVIS,supra note
table or municipal institutions. See also CHAYES,
33, at 25.
36. Dodd, supra note 23, at 1151-53.
37. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).The company's purpose was to purchase,
manufacture and place on the market for sale, automobiles, motors and devices and ap-
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Company had become tremendously wealthy. In fact, after only
13 years in business, it had nearly $112 million in surplus. Henry
Ford, the founder of the company, desired to spread the company's wealth over the country generally. He declared: "[Mly
ambition . . .is . . . to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their
lives and their homes. . . ."88 The board of directors shared Mr.
Ford's vision and voted to increase employee wages and to reduce the price of the car, the company's chief product, in order
. ~ ~ board also decided to suspend
to make it more a f f ~ r d a b l eThe
the payment of special dividends, which in four years had totaled more than $41 million, and to pay only the regular dividends of $1.2 million per year.'O Unfortunately for Mr. Ford,
shareholders, who together owned one-tenth of all the company's stock, protested these plans and filed suit." At trial,
counsel for the corporation argued that: .
Although a manufacturing corporation cannot engage in humanitarian works as its principal business, the fact that it is organized for profit does
not prevent the existence of implied powers to
carry on with humanitarian motives such charitable works as are incidental to the main business
of the corporation."
In the court's view, there was a decided difference between
"an incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for
the benefit of the employees, like the building of a hospital for
their use and the employment of agencies for the betterment of
their condition and a general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the expense of other^."'^
The court explained that
[a] business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
pliances incident to the construction and operation of automobiles. Zd. at 460, 170 N.W.
at 669.
38. Id. at 462, 170 N.W. at 671.
39. Id. at 461-63,170 N.W. at 670-73.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 461, 170 N.W. at 670-71.
42. Id. at 475, 170 N.W. at 684.
43. Id.
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The powers of the directors are to be employed
for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that
end, and does not extend to a change in the end
itself. . . .44

The Ford decision would most certainly foreclose any
thought of gifts to national symphonies, food banks, or humanistic studies at educational institutions outside the community of
the corporation's operations, since they would not be calculated
fact, the courts of the late nineto improve the workforce.'"n
teenth and early twentieth centuries, insisted upon this sort of
connection between the expenditure and the corporati~n.'~
These courts upheld contributions to local educational institutions for the purpose of fitting persons to be its employees;" donations to community chests devoted to social, educational and
recreational purposes in the community to satisfy employee^;'^
donations to Y.M.C.A.s located along railroad lines to accommodate the railroads' employee^;'^ donations to build churches to
provide for the employees' spiritual needs;60 and donations for
44. Id. The powers of the directors included those expressly granted in the corporation's charter, as well as those that are implied. Implied powers are those incidental to
and connected with the carrying into effect or the accomplishing of the general purposes
of the corporation, as expressed in the object clauses of the corporation's charter. According to Cary & Eisenberg,
This approach [was] strongly justified, for the demands of the
business world and the public on a corporation are not
static. . . The social policy that sought to limit corporate
power by restricting their size and activity fell victim to the
changes initiated by the industrial revolution.
CARY& EISENBERG,
supra note 34, a t 40-41. See also LATFIN,CORPORATIONS
205-06
(1971).
45. Instead of proclaiming altruistic objectives, had Mr. Ford simply offered the
prospect of increased sales of cars in response to a retail price reduction and increased
productivity from employees as a result of higher wages as the reasons for his plan, the
court might well have sustained it.
46. The limits of the business corporation's power to give to charitable causes under
this theory were explored exhaustively in Cousens, How Far Corporations May Contribute to Charity, 35 VA. L. REV.401 (1949).
47. Cousens, supra note 46 a t 404 (citing Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum, 285
F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922)).
48. Id. a t 406-07 (citing American Rolling Mill Co. v. Comm'r, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.
1930)).
49. Id. at 408 (citing Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Comm'r, 22 B.T.A. 949 (1931);
Gulf Mobile R.R. v. Comm'r, 22 B.T.A. 233 (1931)).
50. Id. at 409-10 (citing Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718
(Sup. Ct. 1896)).

Heinonline - - 20 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 248 1990

19901

CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY

249

hospital construction in the c~mmunity.~'
Similarly, where corporations made contributions to projects designed to increase
the number of prospective customers," and donations "in order
to obtain goodwill and to maintain prestige where such results
were sufficiently probable as to constitute a prospect of direct
benefit,"6s they were held to be within the corporation's implied
or incidental powers.
Early cases upholding gifts on the basis of the corporation's
implied powers illustrate that the choices made by corporate
managers were conservative and bore a demonstrable relationship to the corporation. In other words, they were calculated to
stabilize and cultivate the workforce as well as customers, thus
providing direct benefits to the employees and improving public
relations. In later cases, this reasoning was extended to uphold
gifts to those objects, such as liberal arts studies and general
charitable foundations, whose relationship to the corporation
and the prospect of future benefits to the corporation was at
best uncertain. Three modern cases addressed the legality of
such giving.
In A.P. Smith v. BarlowP4 the corporation was engaged in
the manufacture and sale of valves, fire hydrants and special
equipment, mainly for the water and gas industries. Over the
years, the company had contributed regularly to the local community chest and occasionally to colleges situated in the same
county as the company.66
In 1951, the board of directors adopted a resolution to con. ~ ~ corporation's chartribute $1,500 to Princeton U n i v e r s i t ~The
Shareholders
ter did not expressly authorize the c~ntribution.~'
51. Id. at 414 (citing Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929);
J.P. Coats, Inc. v. Comm'r, 28 B.T.A. 1128 (1933)).
52. Id. a t 420 (citing Davis v. Old Colony R.R., 131 Mass. 258 (1881) (world's peace
jubilee and international music festival); Tomkinson v. South Eastern Ry., 35 Ch.D. 675
(1887) (world's fair)).
53. Id. a t 420-22. Such donations took the form of gifts to literary and scientific
organizations, state fairs and public baseball fields.
54. 13 N.J.145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. A statute provided that directors could cause their corporation
to contribute for charitable and educational purposes and the
like . . . such reasonable sum or sums as they may determine
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of the corporation questioned the gift on the ground that the
directors were without the necessary power to make the gift, and
the board of directors sought a declaratory judgment on the
que~tion.'~
The court upheld the gift on both statutory and common
law principle^.^^ First, charitable contributions were a lawful exercise of the corporation's implied and incidental powers as defined by the prevailing economic and social condition^.^^ The
court stated:
[Jlust as the conditions prevailing when corporations were originally created required that they
serve public as well as private interests, modern
conditions require that corporations acknowledge
and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which
they operate.("
The significant "modern conditions" which were different from
those prevailing at the time the common law rule evolved were
the transfer of most of the nation's wealth to corporate hands
and the imposition of heavy burdens by individual taxation. As
individuals were unable to keep pace with increased philanthropic needs, charities "with justification, turned to corporations to assume the modern obligations of good citizenship in
the same manner as humans do."6a As state legislatures and
Congress encouraged corporate contribution^,^^ corporations
. . . provided . . . that such contributions might not be made
in situations where the proposed donee owned more than 10%
of the voting stock of the donor and provided further that
such gifta be limited to 5% of capital and surplus unless . . .
authorized by the stockholders.
$ 14:3-13.1 (1950).
N.J. Rev. STAT.
58. A.P. Smith, 13 N.J. at 145, 98 A.2d at 581.
59. Id.
60. Id. '
61. Id. at 150,98 A.2d at 586.
62. Id.
63. The preamble to the 1950 version of the New Jersey statute declared that:
[I]t shall be the public policy of our state and in furtherance
of the public interest and welfare that encouragement be given
to the creation and maintenance of institutions engaged in
community fund, hospital, charitable, philanthropic, educational, scientific or benevolent activities or patriotic or civic
activities conducive to the betterment of social and economic
conditions.
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came "to recognize that their salvation rests upon a sound economic and social environment which in turn rests in no insignificant part upon free and vigorous nongovernmental institutions
of learning."@'
The court went further:
But even if we confine ourselves to the terms of
the common law rule in its application to current
conditions, such expenditures may likewise readily be justified as being for the benefit of the corporation; indeed, if need be the matter may be
viewed strictly in terms of actual survival of the
corporation in a free enterprise ~ystem.'~

The shareholders' claims were dismissed and in a chastising
tone, the court .stated:
Clearly then, the [shareholders] whose private interests rest entirely upon the well-being of the
. . . corporation, ought not be permitted to close
their eyes to present-day realities and thwart the
long-visioned corporate action in recognizing and
voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a
constituent of our modern social s t r u c t ~ r e . ~ ~

The benefit identified in this case, the preservation of free enterprise, obviously was neither an immediate nor direct one. Indeed, the relationship between the act and its goal (a $1;500 gift
to Princeton and the strengthening of "free enterprise"), while
perhaps perceptible, is still remote, almost fanciful.
In Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Trustees, Inc.ie7 the corporation
adopted a resolution authorizing a $5,000 contribution of corporate funds to the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation, a nonprofit entity organized by the corporation, and dedicated to
charitable, scientific, religious and educational purposes.08
N.J. REV.STAT.8 14:3-13.1 (1950).
In 1968, the New Jersey statute was amended to delete the previous 5 percent of
surplus limit on contributions and to provide that a corporation has such power to make
charitable contributions "irrespective of corporate benefit." N.J. REV.STAT.8 14A:3-4
(1968).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

A.P. Smith, 13 N.J. at 150, 98 A.2d at 586.
Id.
Id. at 154, 98 A.2d at 590.
8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958).
Id.
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Here, as in A.P.Smith, the court found the concept of implied powers to be fluid, one defined by the prevailing social and
economic conditions. Thus, in the present era, the effect of increasing tax burdens on individuals who had long supported private institutions to which corporations looked for their supply of
business executives, was significant. Such conditions initiated
new calls upon business corporations for financial support of
these institutions, and led to a "new concept of corporate resp~nsibility."~~
This new conception had achieved the status of
business
which seemed to be nurtured by legislative,
corporate and judicial thinking.?' It followed that under this new
concept of corporate responsibility, corporations necessarily had
the implied power to make contributions to charity if they appeared reasonably designed to assure a present or foreseeable future benefit to the c~rporation.?~
The "benefit" to the corporation here was goodwill engendered by the contribution^.^^ I t was
not too much unlike the sponsoring of a baseball
team, subsidizing promising scholars with a view
toward possibly employing them later on, giving
to the local community chest, paying the salary of
public relations expert, sponsoring a concert or
television program, or conducting a newspaper or
radio advertising program. Such actions seldom
produce any immediate and direct corporate benefits, but all involve use of corporate funds that
otherwise could have gone to shareholders had
such funds remained unspent."

While the type of goodwill identified presented a closer connection to the business than the distant goal of preserving free
enterprise identified in A.P. Smith, the Union Pac. R.R. Co.
court was willing to embrace a much broader conception of implied powers:
69. Id. at 102-3, 329 P.2d at 400-1.
70. The court credited the testimony of several business executives that it was
sound business policy to contribute to charitable causes. Id. at 102, 329 P.2d at 401.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 105, 329 P.2d at 402.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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[T]o illustrate a type of corporate power that we
would consider implied, that within the first decade of its existence, on the occasion of the San
Francisco earthquake, . . . the Union Pacific,
without charge, shipped in 1,600 carloads of food
and material and gave $200,000 cash to, and evacuated a quarter of a million persons from the
stricken area gratis.76
The court seemed to say that to the extent that the corporation, by these magnanimous acts, will improve the corporation's
reputation and promote favorable public attitudes toward it, the
corporation achieves a benefit that is legally sufficient.
In Theodora Holding Corp. v. Hender~on,?~
the corporation
resolved to make a contribution of $528,000 to a charitable foundation, which was authorized to operate exclusively in the fields
of "religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."77
The corporation previously had made smaller cash gifts to the
foundation and had donated a large tract of land valued a t
nearly $500,000 for the purpose of establishing a camp for
under-privileged boys.78
The gift was upheld on the basis of the Delaware statute
which specifically empowered corporations to make charitable
contribution^.^^ In contrast to the New Jersey statute a t issue in
A.P. Smith, the Delaware statute contained no limitations on
the amount of any gift that might lawfully be made or on the
permissible donees.s0 The court therefore had only common law
75. Id. at 103, 329 P.2d at 400 (footnote omitted).
76. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
77. Id. at 404.
78. Id. It was interesting, yet apparently not significant to the court, that Henderson, who held voting control of the corporation, also controlled the affairs of the charitable foundation and maintained an underground home at the camp. The plaintiff might
well have argued the impropriety of the gift as a "pet project" of the controlling shareholder. There was no doubt, however, that the foundation was recognized as a legitimate
charitable trust by the Internal Revenue Service. Id.
79. Id. at 404. The Delaware General Corporation Law provided that every corporation created thereunder "shall have the power to make donations for the public welfare
or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other national
emergency in aid thereof. . ." Id. (Citing DEL.CODEANN.TIT. 8, § 122(9) (1974)).
80. Id.

.
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principles as its guide and concluded that the test to be applied
Accordingly, three facts were deciwas one of reasonablenes~.~'
sive: the gift represented less than 2% of the corporation's total
income; it fell within the amount allowed as a deduction by the
Internal Revenue Code; and it actually produced a reduction in
capital gains taxes.ea The court concluded:
It is accordingly obvious, in my opinion, that the
relatively small loss of immediate income otherwise payable to plaintiff and the corporate defendant's other stockholders, had it not been for
the gift in question, is far out-weighed by the
overall benefits flowing from the placing of such
gift in channels where it serves to benefit those in
need of philanthropic or educational support,
thus providing justification for large private holdings, thereby benefiting plaintiff in the long run.83
Only in the most abstract sense, can the "long-run benefit" identified by this court be translated into the economic terms that
Surely, the theory of these
the common law rule c~ntemplated.~'
holdings is so broad that it would not be frivolous to say that
~ ~ range and amount of
under it, any gift can be j u ~ t i f i e d .The
corporate charitable contributions today suggest that the comId. at 405.
Id.
Id.
One economist recognized the theoretical difficulty of such a task:
It may be argued that all this amounts to long-run profit maximization and thus that management in the modern corporation does no more than business management has always tried
to do, allowing for changed circumstances. But the uncertainty
attached to some benefits (say those of being a high-wage employer), the difficulty of translating into cash terms others
(such as maintaining good community relations), the remoteness in time of still others (such as supporting liberal arts education) indicate that profit maximization must be given a very
elastic interpretation indeed to cover all these activities. . . .
See Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM.ECON.REV.311, 313-14 (1957).
85. Corporate managers may nonetheless be constrained by the common law doctrine of waste, that is, the diversion of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary purposes, such as where the corporation does not receive adequate consideration for its assets. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979)(executive stock option
plan); Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 278 N.E.2d 642 (1972).
Further, the fiduciary obligations of corporate officers and directors would preclude application of corporate assets to their personal use or benefit. See generally, CARY& EISENBERC, 8Upra note 34, at 563-64.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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mon law rule imposes little constraint upon corporations in the
selection of charitable objects. Our examination of the actual
giving practices as reported by a variety of sources, including
corporations, support this view. While the following summaries
are by no means offered as an empirical analysis of the philanthropic practices of all business corporations, they are nonetheless instructive as to the need for concrete reform.
IV. T H E O B J E C T S
PHILANTHROPY

OF

THE

CORPORATIONS'

As the quoted sponsorship acknowledgment suggests, Mobil
Oil Corporation has been a long-standing supporter of public
television. In its own words, Mobil explains that it
is committed to the support of cultural and community programs for many reasons, one of which
is the sincere belief that corporations must be so. cially responsible in every aspect of their business. A corporation exists within a society and
Mobil believes that as a corporation enriches a society - preserving and enhancing society's best
values - it helps create a more beneficial environment for all.B6
In 1987, Mobil Foundation made charitable contributions to
culture and the arts totalling $1.4 million.e7 Of the $2.10 million
given to civic causes,88several are noteworthy in that it is difficult to view them as anything but the product of pure altrusim.
Consider a $50,000 grant to the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration
Corporation; a $1,500 grant to the Fifth City Human Development, Inc.; a $2,500 gift to the Orphan Asylum Society of the
City of Brooklyn; and a $2,000 gift to St. Francis Friends of the
Poor, I ~ C . ~ @
The charitable giving of Exxon Corporation was similar to
Mobil's, although Exxon's total contributions of more than $39.7
86. MOB&CORPORATION,
A GUIDETO MOBIL'SSUPPORT
OF ARTSAND CULTURE
1
(1986).
87. See MOBILSTATEMENT,
supra note 2, at 10.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. at 10-14. In addition, Mobil gave $1.4 million to community causes; $3.99
million to education; and $1.06 million to health agencies and hospitals. Id. at 17, 22-24.
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million far'exceeded M o b i l ' ~ .Exxon's
~~
giving was divided into 5
program areas: environment, public information and policy research; education; health, welfare and community services; arts,
museums, and historical associations; and public broadcasting
pr~gramming.~'Most of these grants would meet the common
law test because the gifts were made to entities within the communities in which the corporation operates, to institutions of
higher learning that offer research degree programs related to
the corporation's operations, to activities and events likely to result in publicity for the corporation, or to conservative public
policy research organizations designed to influence public opinion and laws.g2
Many of the earmarked grants, however, would be highly
questionable under the common law rule. Consider a $9,000
grant to the American Antiquarian Society for a conference on
"Teaching the History of the Book;"gS a $37,500 gift to Johns
Hopkins University "[iln support of a doctoral program in Political and Moral Tho~ght;"~'and a $49,000 gift to the University
of Minnesota, "[flor an effort to identify the knowledge and
competencies that beginning secondary school teachers should
have. "86
Under its Environment, Public Information and Policy Research Program, Exxon gave $5,000 to Partners for Livable
Places, Washington, D.C. for forums entitled, "Cities in Transi~ ~ $15,000 to Ms. Foundation" and "Hispanics in A m e r i ~ a "and
tion for Women, Inc., New York "[tlo assist a national economic
development and technical assistance program for organizations
serving low-income, rural and minority women."87 In the Health
and Human Services Program, Exxon gave $25,000 to Johns .
Hopkins University Center for Alternatives to Animal T e ~ t i n g , ~ ~
90. E x x o ~REPORT,
supra note 3, at 3.
91. Id. at 3.
92. See generally id. Contributions included gran& to such organizations as the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Washington, D.C.($130,000); Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C. ($145,000); and the Heritage Foundation, Washington,
D.C. ($30,000). Id. at 6-7.
93. Id. at 41.
94. Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 48.
96. Id. s t 5.
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id. at 14.
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$12,000 to Harvard University, School of Public Health "toward
research into uses of mass media to help prevent adolescent substance abuse,"BBand, under its Curriculum and Teaching Program, a $30,000 to the Linguistic Society of America "[tlo allow
innovative programming to be incorporated into the plans for its
Linguistic I n s t i t ~ t e s . " ' ~ ~
In 1987, Gannett Foundation, which is funded by contributions from Gannett Company, Inc.,lol gave $1.24 million to the
homeless;loa$415,000 to the mentally disabled;loSand $1.13 million to the poor.lo4 Its contributions to charity totalled more
than $29 million.lo6While the human concern behind these gifts
is clear, donations to the Gannett Foundation's Adult Literacy
Program of $1.15 million106and donations to journalism education programs of $6.59 millionlo7reveal a measure of self-interest, as Gannett's business depends on the literacy of both its audience and employees.
In 1987; AT&T Foundation made contributions of $14.9
million to educational institutions and programs, which went to
well-known colleges and universities for liberal arts as well as
science and engineering programs.loBIn addition, grants to various health centers and hospitals, included causes with no partic-,
ular relationship to the corporation, such as $50,000 to American
Red Cross Disaster Fund; $10,000 to Evangelical Health Sys99. Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 42.
101. Gannett Company, Inc. is a publicly held corporation engaged in various media
related activities including newspaper publishing and radio and television broadcasting.
102. GANNETT
FOUNDATION,
1987 ANNUAL
REPORT(1987).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. In general, Gannett Foundation donated $11.94 million in local grants
(which included programs in community development, conservation, crime prevention,
culture, disaster assistance, economy, education, health, recreation, and social services);
$3.5 million to Community Priorities Program (such as the Addison County Community
Action Group, Burlington, Vermont, Community Services Resource Corporation, Los Angeles, California and the Children's Aid Society, New York, New York); $2.99 million in
journalism grants; $3.84 in special grants (such as to the Library of Congress, Hope for a
Drug-Free America, Washington, D.C. and the United Negro College Fund, New York,
New York); $1.73 million to Adult Literacy; $3.61 to Operating Programs; and $1.53 to
Scholarship and Matching Gifts. Id.
106. Id. a t 29.
107. Id. at 42.
108. AT&T, PUBLICSERVICE
ACTIVITY1986/1987,A BIENNIAL
REPORT11 (1988).
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tems, Illinois; and $12,500 to the Fund for Human Dignity, New
York.loB
Under its "Social Action" category, AT&T gave $12,500 to
the National Adoption Exchange; $5,000 to the Wilderness Society; $20,000 to the Colorado Amateur Sports Corporation; and
$30,000 to the National Puerto Rican Coalition, Virginia.ll0
In 1987, ARCO Foundation made grants totalling $11.39
million.111 Of this total $3.56 million or 31 percent went to colleges and universities in liberal arts and science and technical
programs and $5.66 million or 50 percent went to community
programslla such as $25,000 to the Alliance for Aging Research,
Washington, D.C., for Public Education and Policy Studies on
the Aging Process;11B$5,000 to the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, Washington, D.C.;l14 $5,000 to Projects, Hermosa
toO O
Beach, California, for Emergency Shelter P r ~ g r a m ; ~ ~ ~ l O , O
Community Food Resources Council, Pasadena, California, for
Surplus Food Distribution for Low-Income People;l16 $3,000 to
Human Resources Council, San Andreas, California, for Legal
Assistance Services;"' $1,200 to the Peninsula Learning Resource, Kenai, Alaska, to Purchase Books and Materials for Students and Tutors;lle and $14,500 to Brothers Redevelopment,
Denver Colorado, for "Paint-a-Thon" Low Income Housing
Rehabilitation.llB
In its 1987 publication, General Electric Foundation boasts
of its contributions to assist in coping with the AIDS problem,
to which it contributed $28,170;la0its involvement with the Na109. Id. at 43.
110. Id. at 45-48.
111. ARCO FOUNDATION,
1987 ANNUAL
REPORT
4 (1988).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Id. at 20.
116. Id. at 22.
117. Id. at 22.
118. Id. at 36.
119. Id. at 13. ARCO Foundation further contributed $1.24 million (11 percent of its
total' contributions) to Arta and Humanities, which included grants to the Museum of
Modern Art, New York ($2,500); Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington ($2,500); Ford's
Theatre, Washington ($10,000); Dance Theatre of Harlem, New York ($28,500); and
Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arta ($25,000). Id. at 4, 15, 25, 34.
120. Id. at 21.
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tional Center for Therapeutic Riding, Washington, D.C.
(through a $10,000 c~ntribution);'~'its support of the National
Council on Alcoholism with a $25,000 grant;laaits $25,000 contribution to the African Medical and Research Foundation;las its
$30,380 donation to the Lowndes County (Alabama) public
schools;1a4and a $49,300 grant to Young AudiencesIGE Foundation Artists Award.la6In all, GE contributed $37 million to such
social causes.la6

,V. CONCLUSIONS
From an analysis of the judicial cases and actual charitable
practices of some of the largest corporate contributors, two propositions seem valid: 1) any gift can be couched in such terms as
to promise the kinds of intangible, long-run benefits heid by the
courts as legally sufficient and 2) any charitable contribution to
generally recognized social causes thus benefits the corporation.

.

To achieve these benefits, the philanthropic object need not
be related to the corporation. Instead, the corporation's only
burden is to publish its efforts. In other words, it is simply the
act of giving, when known, which generates favorable attitudes
among employees, customers and the electorate.. The common
law benefit requirement, as such, is without meaningful content
as a limitation on the power of corporate managers. To answer
the initial question posed by this essay, the only limitations appear to be those imposed upon directors by their general fiduciary obligations to the corporation. Large publicly held corporations do not hesitate to declare their commitment to achieving
social ends with corporate assets (even though their primary motivation may be some long-run economic benefit). Yet, for corporations with less economic and political standing than Exxon
and Gannett, the benefit requirement may remain a deterrent to
some managers who, fearing shareholder challenges, may follow
a conservative path in making donations to charitable causes.la7
121. Id. at 22.
122. Id. at 22.
123. Id. at 26.
124. Id. at 22.
ELECTRIC
FOUNDATION,
INC.,THEGE FOUNDATIONS
1987 ANNUALRE125. GENERAL
PORTS 23 (1988).
126. Id. at 1.
127. Charitable contribution8 have been a recurring issue at the annual sharehold-
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These involuntary choices may ignore social priorities, leaving
many worthwhile causes wanting.
On the surface there appears some disharmony between the
actual practices of corporations and the dictates of the common
law rule. It is time formally to free corporate managers from the
common law's lingering grasp.

era' meetings. See INVESTOR
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